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CASESNONNISSE 
REVIEW OF A REFUSAL TO GRANT 
A PROSPECTING RIGHT 
113 
Global Pact Trading 207 (Pty) Ltd v The Minister· 
of Minerals ·and Energy; The Regional Manager: 
Minerals and Energy, Free State Region; The 
Deputy Director-General: Mine~als and Energy 
(Case Nr 3118/2006 (O) u·nreported) 
1 Introduction 
The decision involved an application for the review and setting aside of a 
refusal to grant a prospecting right in terms of section 17 of the Mineral and 
Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 .(the "MPRD Act"){par 1). 
The decision also dealt with the right (and duty) of an applicant to an internal 
appeal in terms of section 96 of the MPRD Act (par 5) as well as the 
procedural fairness of the decision (par18). The decision by the state to 
refuse the application for a prospecting right was reviewed and set .aside by 
the court, without requiring such internal appeal, (par 20) as the decision 
was regarded as manifestly unfair. (par 18). The court referred .the matter 
back to the Minister for reconsideration (par 18). . 
At the outset some background information is provided. The idea is not to 
provide a detailed discussion about the application for a prospecting right. 
Thereupon the facts of the case and decision are dealt with and discussed. 
The MPRD Act provides for a three-tier administration, namely: (a) the 
Minister of Minerals and Energy; (b) the Director-General of the Department 
of Minerals and Energy; and (c) Regional Managers· designated for the 
specified .regions (see the respective definitions· in s 1). Owing to the 
delegation of powers and assignment of duties in terms of the MPRD Act, 
which will be discussed below, in practice a four-tier· administration is 
created contrary to the three-tier administration envisaged by the MPRD Act. 
The Minister is inter alia empowered to grant, refuse and· administer 
prospecting rights to minerals (see s 3(2)(a) of the MPRD Act). The Minister 
is also empowered ·to take various administrative decisions in terms of the 
provisions of the MPRD Act (see Badenhorst, Carnelley and Mostert in 
Badenhorst and Mostert Mineral and Petroleum Law of South Africa· (first 
published 2004) (revision service 2) (2-3». Statutory powers conferred 'upon 
the Minister may be delegated in writing by the Minister to the Director-
General, the Regional Manager or any officer of the Department of Minerals 
and Energy. The Minister may also assign any of his or her duties to osuch 
persons (s 103 (1) of the MPRD Act). On 12 May 2004 the Minister (as 
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delegans) did just that in a do<?ument entitled "Delegation of powers by the 
Minister of Minerals and Energy to officers in the Department of Minerals 
and Energy" (the "ministerial delegation") (see Badenhorst, Carnelley and 
Mostert (2-11 to 2-12». For present purposes, the power of granting, or 
refusal of prospecting rights" was delegated to the Deputy Director-General: 
.Mineral ,Development. These express delegations were made subject to 
,several conditions. Only those Conditions relevant to the current decision are 
listed, namely that: 
"(a) any power must t;le exercised judiciously with the necessary discretion 
and with due regard to the applicable· regulations, as well as other 
instructions and control measures determined in terms of the legislation; 
(b) 
(c) only the lowest level is indicated to which the relevant power is 
delegated. This implies that a specific power is also delegated to 
officials in higher posts in the same branch of the department which has 
control over the relevant function; 
(d) 
(e) where an officer is officially appointed to act in any of the indicated 
posts. it is deemed that the delegation applicable to such a post is also 
entrusted to him; 
(f) 
(g) the aforesaid powers may nonetheless be exercised by the Minister 
notwithstanding the fact that they have been delegated; 
(h) 
(i) the said powers may not be further delegated without the consent of the 
Minister" (Badenhorst, Ca.rnelley and Mostert 2-11). 
The Minister may withdraw a delegation or aSSignment and withdraw or 
amend any decision made by. a delegate (s 103(4». The Minister is not 
divested of any power or exempted from any of his or her duty upon 
delegation or assignment (s 103(5). 
An· application for a prospecting right must be lodged at the office of the 
;appropriate Regional Manager (see 16(1) of the MPRD Act). The Regional 
,Manager must accept a lodgement of an application for a prospecting right if 
the requirements for lodgement are met, and if no other person holds a 
relevant. right in the ·same mineral and land (s 16(1) and (2». If the 
application does not comply with such requirements, the Regional Manager 
must notify the applicant in writing within 14 days of receipt of the application 
(s 16(3». Alternatively, the Regional Manager must notify the applicant in 
writing of acceptance of the lodgement of the application (s 16(4) of the 
MPRD Act) (par 13). 
Before a prospecting right may be granted, requirements regarding 
financial resources, technical ability, estimated expenditure, prevention of 
pollution, and health and safety must also be met (see further s 17(1 )). Upon 
compliance thereof and additional requirements (inter alia, regarding an 
environmental management plan and notification and consultation with 
own~.rs· and affected parties (see further 8adenhorst and Mostert 16.3.1», 
the Regional Manag·er has to forward the application to the Deputy Director-
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General for consideration (s 16(5) of the MPRD Act). If all the statutory 
requirements are met, the Deputy Director-General: Mineral Development is 
obliged to grant a prospecting right (s 17(1); the Ministerial delegation of 12 
May 2004). 
However, in terms of the current version of the statute, an applicant 
whose rights or legitimate expectations have been materially and adversely 
affected or who is aggrieved by any administrative decision in terms of this 
Act may appeal in the prescribed manner to: (a) the Director-General, if it is 
an administrative decision by a Regional Manager- or an officer; or (b) the 
Minister, if it is an administrative decision by the Director-General (s 96(1) of 
the MPRD Act). 
2 Facts 
Global Pact Trading 207 (Ply) Ltd (the '~applicant") lodged the application for 
a prospecting right at the office of the Regional Manager: Minerals and 
Energy, Free State region (the "second respondent") on 22 September 2005. 
The application was accepted by the second respondent in a letter dated 16 
October.2005: In a letter dated 26 April 2006 the applicant was inter alia 
informed that the application does not comply with section 17(1)(a) and (b) 
of the MPRD Act due to outstanding information and documents (par 14). 
The applicant was requested to submit such outstanding information and 
documents (see further par14). A written response (consisting together with 
annexure thereto of some 24 pages) to the request letter was send to and 
received at the office of the second respondent on to May 2006 (par 15). As 
a result of misfiling the written response was not considered by th~ second 
respondent when he made his written recommendation to the Deputy 
Director-General: Minerals and Energy (the "third respondent") to refuse the 
applicant's application for a prospecting right and was not referred to in the 
recommendation. It was accepted that the third respondent did not consider 
the written response when he accepted the recommendation by the second 
respondent on 19 June 2006 to refuse the application par 16). The decision 
to refuse the application for a prospecting right by the applicant was taken by 
the third respondent (par 2). 
3 Decision 
3 1 It was accepted by the court as undisputed that the decision to grant or 
refuse an application for a prospecting right constitutes an administrative 
action, as defined in PAJA (see par 17). The court found that the power 
to grant or refuse an application for a prospecting right in terms of 
section 17 of the MPRD Act was delegated by the first respondent to the 
third respondent (see· par 2).· 
32 The court held that the internal remedy of appeal to the first respondent 
in terms of section 96 of the MPRD Act was not available to the 
applicant. To put it differently, there was no duty on the applicant in 
terms of section 96 of the MPRD Act to exhaust internal remedies by 
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appealing to the Minister (see par 5). It could be questioned whether the 
appeal from the Deputy Director-General as an lIofficer" should not have 
. been to the Director-General of the Department and not the Minister. 
The court reasoned that in the field of delegation of administrative 
power a distinction has to be made between deconcentration of power 
and decentralisation of power: Decentralisation of administrative power 
takes place when powers· are transferred to an independent organ or 
body which carries out these powers and functions entirely in its own 
name. Deconcentration of administrative power is applicable where the 
functions are performed by the delegate in the name or on behalf of the 
de/egans (ie the delegating authority), in others words the de/egans acts 
by means of the delegate (par 6). 
The distinction between the two forms of delegation of administrative 
power is further explained with reference to their respective features: 
With decentralisation· of admin'istrative power the delegans has no 
authority to act on behalf of the delegate and has no control over the 
independent body other than appointment of the members thereof an/or 
some form of appeal agail"!st the decision of that body. On the ·other 
hand, with deconcentration of" administrative power the de/egans may 
withdraw the delegation at any time and perform the function himself or 
. herself. The de/egans may 81so· exercise various forms of control over 
the delegate (par 6) and -require reports on the execution of the functions 
and relieve the delegate of hfs duties (Bu~ns Administrative Law under 
the 1996 Constitution 2ed (2003) 166; and Baden horst, Carnelley and 
. .,., 
Mostert 2-12). To these features may be added another common . law 
principle applicable to decorlf:entration: Although it is the delegate that 
performs the function or makes tne decision, it is done· on be~alf of. the 
delegans and it is 'regarded as being· performed by the delegans. Once 
the decision has been finally taken or "the function performed, the 
deJegans is bound· by the decision or· performance (Burns 166; and 
Badenhorst, Carnelley and Mostert 2-11 to 2-12). 
The court held that the delegation of power to the third respondent 
took place in a scheme of deconcentration of public power (par 5) (see 
also Badenhorst, Carnelley and Mostert 2-11). Upon analysis of section 
103(4} and (5) of the MPRD Act and the conditions (a), (f)-(h) of the 
written delegation by the Minister, the court reasoned that the first 
respondent has the power to (a) revoke the delegation to the third 
respondent and to exercise the power deieg~ted ~erself; ·and, (b) the 
power to exercise control over the exercise of the delegated power (par 
8). 
The court accordingly found that when the third respondent refused to 
grant a prospecting right to the applicant, the. third respondent acted on 
. behalf of the first respondc;mt. The court found further that the first 
respondent acted through. the third respondent and that the decision to 
, refuse must be regarded as the decision of the first respondent (par 8). 
The court found. that thti third respondent is an "officer" in terms of the 
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MPRD Act. The court reasoned that if the decision in law is regarded as 
a decision of the third respondent, then, in terms of section 96 of the 
MPRD Act an appeal would lie not to the first respondent, but to the 
Director-General (par 9). 1n other words, upon' refusal by the Deputy 
Director-General, to grant a prospecting right an applicant for a 
prospecting right has to appeal to the Director-General in terms of 
section 96{1 )(a) of the MPRD Act. In order to have arrived at this 
conclusion the couf1, looked at the definitions of "Director-.General", 
"department" and "officer" as defined in section 1 of the MPRD Act (see 
par 9). The court, however, argued that it had not been intended that the 
exercise of the power granted to the first respondent could be appealed 
against to a lower ranking official, to wit the Director-General. According 
to the court, this anomaly does not arise if the decision is regarded as 
the decision of the first respondent (par 9). 
On the aforegoing basis the court held that :no appeal in terms of 
section 96 of the MPRD Act was available to the applicant (par 8). The 
court also held that section 103(4)(b) of the MPRD Act does not provide 
an internal remedy to an applicant for a prospecting right (par 10). 
According to the court an internal remedy 'is a remedy that an aggrieved 
person may exercise as of right. To seek an indulgence, which at best is 
what the request to act in terms of section 10(4)(b) would amount· to, 
does not constitute a remedy (par 10). 
The court noted obiter that section 96' creates an absolute duty that 
internal remedies should be exhausted before taking the matter to court 
(par 11). 
3 3 The court further confirmed that the refusal to grant a prospecting right, 
as an administrative action which materially and adversely affects the 
rights or legitimate expectations of a person, must be procedurally fair as 
set out in PAJA (s 3(1), as read with s 33 of the Constitution of the 
Republic 'of· South Africa, 1996). If an administrative action is 
procedurally unfair, .the court has the power in terms of section 16(2)(c) 
of PAJA to review an administrative action (par 7). ' 
The court found that the respondents called for further information 
from the applicant and indicated that if such' further information is 
received timeously, it will be considered when :adjudicating upon the 
application by the relevant authority. However,' it, failed to consider 
relevant information timeously received due to the 'misfiling of a fax. The 
court held in conclusion: 
"In our judgment this is manifestly procedurally unfairt as was properly 
conceded by counsel for the respondents. We conclude. therefore, that 
the decision to refuse the applicant's application, for the prospecting right, 
in question is fatally flawed by prOCe9LJrai unfairness. It follows that this 
decision must be set aside" (par 18). 
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4 Discussion 
V~rious issues are noteworthy frqm the judgment: firstly, the discussion of 
the differentiation of the two types of delegation by the court and the lack of 
an appeal in instances of deconcentration. resulting in no internal remedies 
toi be exhausted prior to the approach to the court; secondly. procedural 
fairness; as well as thirdly, the remedy that the court used, namely referring 
the decision 'back for reconsideration. Lastly, the proposed legislative 
amendment is also relevant. 
4: 1 The delegation and the exhaustion of internal 
remedies 
It : is inevitable that government power has to be delegated and sub-
d~legated to facilitate the divisior;l of labour (Hoexter Administrative Law in 
South Africa (2007) 236; and 'Burns 164). This is recognised by the 
Constitution in section 238(a) that' an executive organ of state may delegate 
any power or function that is to be exercised or performed in terms of the 
legislation provided that the delegation is consistent with the legislation. In 
casu the possibility of delegation is expressly contained and regulated in the 
statute. 
:As a result of the ministerial delegation. for purposes of the application of 
a prospecting right by an applicant, a four-tier administration exists, namely: 
(a) the Minister of Minerals and Energy; (b) the Director-General of the 
Department of Minerals and Energy; (c) the Deputy Director-General; and 
(d) the Regional Manager for the relevant region: 
: The application for a prospecting right is submitted to the Regional 
Manager. Acceptance of lodgem~nt of an application for a prospecting right 
ta,kes place by the Regional Manager. Upon such acceptance the application 
is; forwarded to the Deputy Direc~or-General. An application for prospecting 
right is granted or refused by the Deputy Director-General. As the power to 
dq so is delegated to him from the Min!ster - there is in this instance no right 
of appeal 'to the Minister. This is relevant in practice as the applicant can 
directly approach the court where the decision is questionable, instead of 
having to go through the internal appeal procedures. The right to appeal, 
hQwever, would have remained for those decisions that the Deputy Director-
General makes that are not a delegated power from the Minister. As no such 
oliiginal powers are conferred in the MPRDA on the Deputy Director-
General, he can only act on the delegated powers from the Minister. 
In another mafier decided on the same day by the same judges, 
Mofschaap Diamonds (pty) Ltd v Minister for Minerals and Energy (Case Nr 
3117(2006 (0) unreported), the court verbatim made the same ruling. based 
on the same arguments and sources, regarding the delegation as well as the 
subsequent consequence that no ,right of appeal is available to the Minister 
(Rsr 11-17). 
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Although the legislation creates "a tiered system for these types of 
applications, the delegation of the powers has the "effect in practice that 
these structures are not strictly adhered to. Specifically, in casu, the decision 
of the decision-making official is attributed to the de/egans and" as such is 
not capable of appeal to the de/egans. It should be" noted that in practice 
there are internal controls within the relationship of d,econcentration prior to 
an issue being finalised (Burns 277). Burns (279) ref~rs to a form of control 
of an administrative action within the same administrative hierarchy - an 
"internal appeal" - where the reviewing superior body reviews the 
administrative action de novo. This type of appeal should be distinguished 
from the appeal to admini"strative tribunal, an "admin"istrative appeal". It could 
be "argued that the appeal in section 96 is an "internal appeal". If this 
submission is right, the question is whether the right to appeal in section 96 
is now, post this judgment, superfluous. It would appear to be so, as all the 
powers of the Deputy-General are delegated powers and as such attributed 
to the Minister - if the Global judgment is followed. It should be reiterated 
that there are distinct advantages to internal remedies being exhausted first. 
The courts would only be approached where the dispute could not be settled 
internally in a cheaper and quicker manner. The ,consequences of this 
decision for officials acting on a deconcentrated delegation of powers, which 
include aU government departments, are far-reaching. The possibility of an 
internal appeal would become obsolete and could as a result" place an 
unnecessarily heavy burden on the courts. 
The only manner in which the burden on the courts can be alleviated is if 
the administrative decision-maker could vary or revoke a decision previously 
made. In general a disgruntled individual cannot have a decision re-
considered after it had already been finally made and been published, as the 
functus officio doctrine applies. The Interpretation Act 33 of 1957 (s 10(1» 
provides that unless the contrary intention appears, where powers are 
conferred or duties are imposed these may be exercised "from time to time 
as occasion requires". Hoexter argues that although this enigmatiC provision 
could be interpreted to allow for a free variation or revocation of decision, ~he 
better interpretation would be that it only enables administrators to exerCise 
their powers anew in different situations and not to revisit or revoke their 
existing decisions whenever they like (Hoexter 246): For considerations of 
certainty, fairness and legality official decision-makers are regarded as 
functus officio once a decision has been made (Hoexter 247).There are only 
limited instances where the doctrine would not apply (see Hoexter 247). 
Although most of these exceptions are not relevant in casu, it should be 
mentioned that the functus officio rule would not apply where the legislation 
provides for such a scenario, explicitly or by implication, such as with the tax 
authorities that are permitted to reconsider assessments and issue revised 
assessments (Hoexter 248 with reference to Car/son Investment Share 
Block (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service 2001 3 SA 
210 " (W»). In casu, the legislation, however, does not expressly make 
provision for a re-consideration of the decision by the de/egans. The 
consequences hereof are that once the decision has been made, it is final 
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and the decision-maker functus officio. As mentioned above, the only 
al.ternative available is the courts. . 
The court in casu noted obiter that PAJA creates an absolute duty that the 
internal remedies should be exnausted. The duty is a well-established 
principle in the law. There has, however, always been certain exceptions to 
the rule in common law and even PAJA allows for the exemption of the 
obligation in exceptional circumstances (s 7(2)(c). See in general Hoexter 
478-482}. Apart from the fact that ,the comment was obiter, it is submitted 
that there is no reason to believe that the court intended to do away with the 
exceptions to the common law rule. 
This decision again illustrates that the· ministerial delegation of powers as 
weI] as the appeal procedures in terms of section 96 should be revisited by 
the legislature (See Badenhorst "Duelling of Prospecting Rights: A Non-
Custodial second? - Meepo Ya Sechaba v Kotze. and Bathopele Mining 
Investments (Pty) Ltd and others 869/2008 (NCO) unreported" (submitted for 
publication in 2008 TSAR). 
4 2 Procedural fairness 
Section 96(1) of the MPRD Act provides that an appiicant whose rights or 
legitimate expectations· have been materially and adversely affected or who 
is aggrieved by any administrative decision has a right to appeal the 
dedision. 
In the Global Pact Trading ma~er, the court confirmed that where an 
adrilinistrator, such as the regional Manager, requests further information 
from an ,applicant and expressly indicates that such further information, if 
received timeously, will be considered upon adjudication; a failure to do so 
will constitute an administrative action which is procedurally unfair and can 
be ~et aside on review by a court of law. 
It should be noted that the applicant did not automatically have a right to 
proyide further information to its ·;already submitted application to rectify 
defects therein. He/she also did no:t have a rig~t for such information to be 
considered by the official. The statute does not make provision for such a 
pO$sibility. The opportunity to rectify defects in the application documents 
arose from the invitation by the officials. The applicant merely has a 
legitimate· expectation based on the e>cpress promise by the official that it 
WOl;lld be done. This principle of legitimate expectation has been accepted 
as part of the. South African law i~ Administrator, Transvaal v Traub. (1989 4 
SA 731 (A)). and confirmed in the .(interim) Constitution of the Republic of 
SOlJth Africa 200 of 1993 as well as PAJA. There is some uncertainty as to 
what exactly would qualify as a legitimate expectation (Hoexter 376-380). On 
the one hand it is argued that a legitimate expectation is dependant on an 
express promise on behalf of the public authority or the existence of an 
es~ablished practice as set out in Claude Neon Ltd v City Council of 
G~rmiston ·(1995 3 SA 710 (W)); Premier, Mpumalanga v Executive 
Committee, Association of State-a~ded Schools, Eastern Transvaal (1999 2 
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SA 91 (CC»; Greys Marine Hout Bay (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Public Works 
([2005] 3 All SA 33 (SCA)); and Oranje Vrystaatse Vereniging vir 
Staatsondersteunde Skole v Premier van die Provinsie Vrystaat (1996 2 
BCLR 248 (0). Hoexter (378) paraphrased the requirements as set out in 
NDPP v Phillips (2002 4 SA 60 (W) as endorsed in SA: Veterinary Council v 
Szymanski 2003 4 SA 42 (SCA) par 20) as follows: "(i) a reasonable 
expectation that was (ii) induced by the decision-maker based on (iii) a clear, 
unambiguous representation which it was (iv) competent and lawful for the 
decision-maker to make". On the other hand there is, some authority that 
something less is required for a legitimate expectation {Bullock NO v 
Provincial Government. North West Province 2004 5 SA 262 (SCA); and 
President of the RSA v SARFU 2000 1 SA 1 (CC». As the facts in casu 
meet the more stringent requirements of the Phillips case, this debate is 
ignored for purposes of this discussion. The bottom line remains that the 
officials must act in the spirit of the Constitution which means that they must 
act fairly, responsibly and honestly (Goodman Bros v Transnet Ltd 1998 4 
SA 989 (W) 9978-D). The question is why ,the court did not mention the 
issue of legitimate expectation. It merely accepted that a right or a legitimate 
expectation was materially and adversely affected and as such had to be 
procedurally fair. The answer can probably be described as one of 
avoidance. Although section 33(1) of the Constitution gives everyone the 
right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable ~nd procedurally fair, 
PAJA limits this to a right (and not a legitimate expectation) by the definition 
of "administrative action" in section 1 (PAJA). The reference to a legitimate 
expectation in section 3 of PAJA appears illogical and a contradiction (see in 
general Hoexter (358-359) and her discussion of the various solutions 
offered by academic writers). It seems as if the court in casu simply ignored 
this anomaly as did the courts in inter alia Minister of Defence v Dunn 
([2007] JOL 20005 (SeA) par 31); Xaluva v MEG, Department of Education 
([2006] JOL 18348 (Ck) par 66); Tirfu Raiders Rugby Club v SARU ([2006] 
JOL 16604 (C»; and Nxele v Chief Deputy Commissioner, Corporate 
Services, Department of Correctional Services ([2006] JOL 17851 (LC»~ 
One can only agree with Hoexter (359) that the legislature should amend 
either section 1 or section 3 to rectify the discrepancy. 
Leaving aside these issues, the court in casu confirmed that where an 
express promise was made by an official, it should be kept, otherwise it 
would result in procedural unfairness. The facts in the Mofschaap matter 
referred to supra, also deal with a prospecting permit and procedural 
fairness. The applicant attempted to interdict the Minister from awarding 
such a permit (par 1). The Minister previously refused the application of 
Mofschaap based on the fact that their application did not meet the statutory 
requirements. Mofschaap unsuccessfully argued, inter alia, that the decision 
of the Minister was procedurally unfair. The crux of this judgment was that 
the court confirmed that competing applications are dealt with in order of 
receipt of the applications. A competing application would thus not be 
processed before an earlier application had been disposed of. This is indeed 
so, if the papers of the application are in order. However, where there is an 
error or an omission in the application, the applicant loses its place in the 
122 OBITER 2008 
queue, as there is no obligation on the Department to give an applicant an 
opportunity to rectify errors or to inform it of any shortcoming in the 
application. Such an obligation would, according to the court, lead to 
administrative chaos and cannot b~regarded as procedurally unfair (par 18). 
It i~ thus the responsibility of the applicant to meet all the statutory 
requirements prior to submission. It cannot expect the Department to revert 
back to it each time a mistake or an omission is made. 
4~ Remedy 
The court in casu did not make the decision whether or not to grant the 
prospecting right, but referred the issue back to the relevant decision-maker. 
This is in line with the general rule and the notion of separation of powers. 
This is also the preferred option in PAJA (s 8(1 )(c)(ii)). The administration is 
after all best equipped to deal with the issue as it has the necessary 
knowledge and experience. The oourts are reluctant to usurp the powers of 
the: adminstration that were delegated to them by the legislature, unless 
there are specific reasons to divert from the general rule (Hoexter 485-492). 
4 4 Legis/ative amendmen1 
It should be noted that the legislature intends to amend sect~on 96(1) of the 
MPRD Act as follows: 
UAny person whose rights or legitimate expectations have been materially and 
adversely affected or who is aggrieved by any administrative decision in terms 
of this Act may appeal within 30 days of becoming aware of such decision in 
the prescribed manner to -
(a) the Director-General, if it is an administrative decision taken by a 
. Regional Manager or any officer to whom the power has been delegated 
or a duty has been assigned by or under this Act; or 
(b) the Minister, if it is an administrative decision taken by the Director-
General or the deSignated agency" (s 69 of the Mineral and Petroleum 
Resources Development Amendment Bill [B10-2007] ("Amendment Bill"). 
':Officer" in section 96(1) is to be replaced to make provision for the officer 
to '!Vhom powers have been delegated and duties have been assigned. The 
rigl:lt of appeal is said to accrue "within 30 days of becoming aware of such 
decision". The proposed amendments to sections 16 and 17 are not relevant 
for purposes of present discussions. 
Section 103(4)(b) of the MPRO Act is to be amended in so far as the 
power of the Minister, Director-General, the Regional Manager or officer to 
withdraw or amend a decision by a delegate is subject to the proviso that 
exi~ting rights may not be affecte~ by such withdrawal and amendment of 
the decision (s 74 of the Amendment Bill). Even though it speaks for itself 
the clarification of the power is to be welcomed. 
,In the present case section 96(1) has already been interpreted in the way 
th~ amendment envisages. The court's decision regarding sections 96(1) 
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and 103 will remain unchanged even if sections 96(1) or 103 of the MPRD 
Act are amended as envisaged. 
5 Conclusion 
The end result achieved in the Global Pact Trading case and the Mofschaap 
decisions can perhaps not be faulted, especially with regard to their 
conclusion on the issue of procedural fairness arising from a legitimate 
expectation based on an express promise of an official. The impact of the 
two decisions is, however, cause for concern. An application for a 
prospecting right is submitted to the Regional Manager and considered by 
the Deputy Director-General. Upon refusal of such an application, the 
applicant can directly apply to court for relief and is not obliged to appeal to 
either the Director-General or the Minister of the Department of Mineral and 
Energy Affairs. As the power to refuse a prospecting right has been 
delegated by the Minister to the Deputy Director-General and the decision of 
the Deputy Director-General is deemed to be that of the Minister, there is no 
possible appeal to a subordinate of or the Minister herself. Whether such 
lack of appeal was intended by the legislature is to be questioned. This 
decision again illustrates that the delegation of powers as well as the appeal 
procedures in terms of section 96 of the MPRD Act should be revi~ited by 
the legislature. 
The discrepancy between section 1 and section 3 of the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act also remains unresolved, making legislative 
intervention necessary. 
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